工商管理核心課程-會計學.ppt41

corporate governance and accounting
Accounting and Economics share some common basic assumptions :
First level: scarcity of resources, complexity and uncertainty of environment, economic men with bounded rationality
Second level: information incompleteness and asymmetry, opportunistic behavior tendency (different utility functions, externality of behavior), positive transaction cost
Result: incomplete contracts
The Nature of the Firm: Jensen & Meckling(1976) the nexus of a set of contracts between owners of production factors, a legal fiction

corporate governance and accounting
The Ownership of the Firm: residual control rights
claim to firm’s residue
Agency problem:
1.principal (information disadvantage) and agent (information advantage) :observability of agent’s action, risk preference
2.adverse selection and moral hazard
ex ante information asymmetry ex ante opportunistic behavior
ex post information asymmetry ex post opportunistic behavior
ex ante i.e. pre-contract, ex post i.e. post-contract
*ex ante opportunistic behavior i.e. adverse selection :screening, signalling, how to induce candidates tell the truth,cost of signal is so high that others can not to reproduce
*ex post opportunistic behavior i.e. moral hazard :
---monitor:social, law, market( market for corporate control,managerial labor market, competitive product and service market,creditors monitor,large shareholders etc.)
---incentive: pecuniary incentive(salary,bonus, restricted stock,stock option, stock appreciation right , phantom stock , long-term performance plan etc.); non-pecuniary incentive(control,reputation,self-satisfaction etc.)

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